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You have no right to mutilate my music by introducing into it
passages, the accompaniments of which are of your own composi-
tion. It was quite enough to put into the Freischutz a duet from
Euryanthe, the accompaniment of which is not mine.-You compel
me, Sir, to address myself to the public, and to make it known
through the French Papers, that it is a robbery which has been com-
mitted on me, not only on my music, by taking that which belongs to
no one but myself, but also on my reputation, by bringing forth,
under my name, mutilated specimens. To avoid all public quarrels,
which are never more advantageous for the art than they are for the
professors of it, I pray you, Sir, forthwith to withdraw from the
piece which you have arranged, all the passages which belong to me.
-Carl Maria von Weber'
* Copyright @ 2014 Peter K. Yu. Kern Family Chair in Intellectual Property Law
and Director, Intellectual Property Law Center, Drake University Law School. This
Article was expanded and updated from Moral Rights 2.0, in LANDMARK IP CASES
AND THEIR LEGACY 13 (Christopher Heath & Anselm Kamperman Sanders eds.,
2011). Earlier versions of this Article were presented at the Inaugural Intellectual
Property Symposium organized by the Texas A&M Law Review, the 14th Annual
Association for the Study of Law, Culture and the Humanities Conference at the
William S. Boyd School of Law at the University of Nevada, Las Vegas, the Internet
Law Works-in-Progress Symposium at Santa Clara University School of Law, the
"Balancing Rights and Interests in the 21st Century" Roundtable at the University of
Technology, Sydney, the Digital Interactive Symposium at the University of Edin-
burgh, and the 10th Anniversary Institute of European Studies of Macau Intellectual
Property Seminar in Macau, China. The Author is grateful to Megan Carpenter, Eric
Goldman, Christopher Heath, Anselm Kamperman Sanders, Ren Reynolds, and Nat-
alie Stoianoff for their hospitality and the participants of these events for their valua-
ble comments and suggestions. He would also like to thank Cory McAnelly and
Megan Snyder for excellent research and editorial assistance.
1. 4 THE HARMONICON, A JOURNAL OF Music 42 (1926), quoted with a different
translation in KEVIN GARNETT & GILLIAN DAVIES, MORAL RIGHTS 1065 (2010). The
German composer wrote this in 1826 "to complain that six pieces from operas of his
had been adapted for use in another drama (the practice of pasticcio) in Paris." GAR-
NET & DAVIES, supra, at 1065.
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I. INTRODUCTION
When the protection of moral rights is brought up in the United
States, commentators have always emphasized the differences be-
tween continental Europe and the United States. 2 Cases that have
been widely used as textbook illustrations include Soc. Le Chant de
Monde v. Soc. Fox Europe3 and Turner Entertainment Co. v. Huston.4
While the Anglo-American copyright regime and the French author's
right (droit d'auteur) regime were quite similar in the eighteenth cen-
tury,5 the protection of moral rights did not attain formal international
recognition until 1928.6 The gap between the U.S. and French systems
has also grown considerably since the enactment of the 1909 U.S.
Copyright Act.'
2. As Cyrill P. Rigamonti observed:
[I]t had been a canon of comparative copyright scholarship that the most
significant difference between Anglo-American and Continental European
copyright law was their respective attitudes toward moral rights. The inclu-
sion of moral rights in statutory copyright law was generally understood to
be the defining feature of the Continental copyright tradition, while the lack
of statutory moral rights protection was considered to be a crucial compo-
nent of the Anglo-American copyright tradition. This dichotomy had been
celebrated and cultivated since World War II on both sides of the Atlantic to
the point where the statutory protection of moral rights or the lack thereof
had become an integral part of each legal system's identity, essentially divid-
ing the world of copyright into two fundamentally different ideal types, one
that includes moral rights, and another that excludes moral rights.
Cyrill P. Rigamonti, Deconstructing Moral Rights, 47 HARV. INT'L L.J. 353, 354
(2006).
3. Cour d'appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Paris, Jan. 13, 1953, D.A. Jur. 16
(Fr.). The U.S. companion case is Shostakovich v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp.,
80 N.Y.S.2d 575 (Sup. Ct. 1948), affd, 87 N.Y.S.2d 430 (App. Div. 1949).
4. Cour d'appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Versailles, civ. ch., Dec. 19, 1994
(Fr.), translated in ENT. L. REP., Mar. 1995, at 3.
5. See Jane C. Ginsburg, A Tale of Two Copyrights: Literary Property in Revolu-
tionary France and America, 64 TUL. L. REV. 991, 1023 (1990) ("The revolutionary
French and American systems shared much not only in theory, but also in practice. In
both systems, formalities encumbered, and sometimes defeated, the acquisition or ex-
ercise of copyright protection. And both systems primarily protected works useful to
advancing public instruction."); Susan P. Liemer, On the Origins of Le Droit Moral:
How Non-economic Rights Came to Be Protected in French IP Law, 19 J. INTELL.
PROP. L. 65, 116 (2011) ("Today literary, visual, and performing artists struggle to
assert their rights while using new technology, just like the early French writers in
print did. Present day legislatures struggle to draft effective intellectual property legis-
lation for our wireless internet society, much like the Comddie-Frangaise playwrights
did once untethered from royal oversight.").
6. During the Rome Revision Conference in 1928, the Berne Convention was
revised to provide international recognition to the rights of attribution and integrity.
See SAM RICKETSON & JANE C. GINSBURG, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT AND
NEIGHBOURING RIGHTS: THE BERNE CONVENTION AND BEYOND 108 (2d ed. 2006).
7. One of the key differences between the United States and continental Europe
was the retention of formalities in U.S. copyright law. These formalities include,
among others, the affixation of copyright notices, the registration and renewal of cop-
yright, and the requirement to deposit two copies of the copyrighted work into the
Library of Congress. See generally Christopher Sprigman, Reform(aliz)ing Copyright,
MORAL RIGHTS
In 1988, the United States, after holding out for more than a cen-
tury, finally joined the Berne Convention for the Protection of Liter-
ary and Artistic Works8  ("Berne Convention"), the leading
multilateral copyright treaty.' Article 6bis(1) of the Convention
provides:
Independently of the author's economic rights, and even after the
transfer of the said rights, the author shall have the right to claim
authorship of the work and to object to any distortion, mutilation or
other modification of, or other derogatory action in relation to, the
said work, which would be prejudicial to his honor or reputation.' 0
Although many different types of moral rights exist throughout the
world, the Berne Convention recognizes only two: the right of attribu-
tion (le droit d la paternitd) and the right of integrity (le droit au re-
spect de l'oeuvre). As of this writing, more than 160 countries have
introduced some form of moral rights."
Notwithstanding the United States's obligations under the Berne
Convention and its role as a vocal global champion of intellectual
property rights, the country has yet to protect moral rights to the same
extent as its counterparts in continental Europe. 2 The Visual Artists
Rights Act of 1990 ("VARA"), which U.S. Congress enacted to en-
sure compliance with the Berne Convention, affords only limited pro-
tection to the rights of attribution and integrity in a small category of
visual art." That statute, sadly, might not even have been enacted had
the U.S. Senate not needed a political compromise between the Dem-
ocrats and the Republicans over the passage of a federal judgeships
bill.14
57 STAN. L. REV. 485, 491-94 (2004) (discussing the formalities requirements in the
early U.S. copyright statutes).
8. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9,
1886, 828 U.N.T.S. 221 (revised at Paris July 24, 1971) [hereinafter Berne
Convention].
9. Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat.
2853. Established in 1886, the Berne Convention entered into force in the United
States in March 1989.
10. Berne Convention, supra note 8, art. 6bis(1).
11. See GARNErr & DAVIES, supra note 1, at 1033 & n.1.
12. See ROBERTA KWALL, THE SOUL OF CREATIVITY: FORGING A MORAL
RIGHTS LAW FOR THE UNITED STATES 37 (2009) (warning that "there is the stark
reality that [the United States] may not be in compliance with [its] obligations under
the Berne Convention").
13. 17 U.S.C. § 106A (2012).
14. As Roberta Kwall recounted:
[O]n the last day of the 101st Congress, a major bill was passed that author-
ized eighty-five new federal judgeships. Sponsors of this bill had to include
several unrelated measures in order to appease senators who would other-
wise oppose the federal judgeships bill. One such measure was VARA,
which had already been passed by the House of Representatives but had
been blocked in the Senate Judiciary Committee by some Republican sena-
tors. Thus, VARA was passed by the full Senate only because those Republi-
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During the negotiation of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects
of Intellectual Property Rights" ("TRIPS Agreement") at the World
Trade Organization ("WTO"), the United States also worked hard to
ensure that WTO members could not use the mandatory dispute set-
tlement process to address inadequate protection of moral rights. Ar-
ticle 9.1 of the TRIPS Agreement explicitly states that "Members shall
not have rights or obligations under this Agreement in respect of the
rights conferred under Article 6bis of [the Berne] Convention or of
the rights derived therefrom." 16 The TRIPS-plus bilateral, plurilateral,
and regional agreements that the United States negotiated in the
2000s did not even mention moral rights." Thus, the differences be-
tween the United States and continental Europe over the protection
of moral rights are likely to persist into the future.
Interestingly, as wide as they are, these differences are unlikely to
present significant challenges to the future development of moral
rights. Some commentators, in fact, have cautioned us not to overstate
the differences between the two regimes. As Justin Hughes reminded
us, although philosophical differences exist between Anglo-American
and continental European copyright laws, neither their differences nor
the role moral rights play in them "should be sketched in carica-
ture."" Likewise, Cyrill Rigamonti observed that differences continue
to exist among the different author's rights regimes in Europe-droit
d'auteur in France, Urheberrecht in Germany, diritto d'autore in Italy,
and derecho de autor in Spain. As he declared:
can senators acquiesced in light of their desire to pass the federal judgeships
bill.
KWALL, supra note 12, at 28.
15. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IC,
108 Stat. 4809, 869 U.N.T.S. 299 (1994).
16. Id. art. 9.1; see also MIRA T. SUNDARA RAJAN, MORAL RIGHTS: PRINCIPLES,
PRACTICE AND NEW TECHNOLOGY 252-58 (2011) (discussing the impact of the
TRIPS Agreement on the international protection of moral rights). It is worth recal-
ling that moral rights "are noncommercial, individual, and cultural rights that, apart
from shared roots in the prerogatives of authorship, do not have much in common
with the economic aspects of copyright law." Id. at 253. Because the WTO dispute
settlement process focuses primarily on trade distortions, the TRIPS negotiators
might have considered significant the differences between moral rights and economic
rights.
17. See, e.g., Central America-Dominican Republic Free Trade Agreement ch. 15,
May 28, 2004, available at http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agree
ments/cafta-dr-dominican-republic-central-america-fta/final-text; Australia-United
States Free Trade Agreement ch. 17, U.S.-Austl., May 18, 2004, available at http://
www.ustr.gov/assets/FradeAgreements/Bilateral/AustraliaFTA/FinalTextsites/
default/files/uploads/agreements/fta/australialasset uploadfile469_5141.pdf; Singa-




18. Justin Hughes, Fixing Copyright: American Moral Rights and Fixing the Dastar
"Gap," 2007 UTAH L. REV. 659, 662 [hereinafter Hughes, Fixing Copyright].
MORAL RIGHTS
Despite the fact that it has harmonized virtually every aspect of cop-
yright protection over the past fifteen years, the European Union
has excluded moral rights from its harmonization efforts on various
occasions. Moreover, the European Commission currently does not
see any need for harmonization in this field and resists the demands
of some European academics for community-wide regulation of
moral rights .1.. 9
In the digital age, the protection of moral rights has raised four new
questions: (1) Have moral rights become obsolete? (2) Can the pro-
tection of these rights meet the demands of a growing semiotic democ-
racy? (3) Would such protection threaten the development of a
participatory democratic culture in countries with heavy information
control? (4) Should moral rights be extended to cover a new "right to
delete" in the digital environment? Closely examining these questions,
this Article explores the legal and policy challenges digital technolo-
gies have posed to the moral rights regime. The Article also queries
whether moral rights need to be "modernized" to reflect ongoing
changes in our socio-technological environment.2 0
II. OBSOLESCENCE
In a recent article, Amy Adler lamented how moral rights have be-
come badly outdated. As she observed:
[M]oral rights are premised on the precise conception of "art" that
artists have been rebelling against for the last forty years. Moral
rights law . . . purports to protect art, but does so by enshrining a
vision of art that is directly at odds with contemporary artistic prac-
tice. It protects and reifies a notion of art that is dead.21
As a result, moral rights are now obsolete; they "endanger art in the
name of protecting it." 2 2 The right of integrity, in particular, "fails to
recognize the profound artistic importance of modifying, even de-
stroying, works of art, and of freeing art from the control of the
artist." 23
Among the many examples cited for support, the most memorable
one concerns Robert Rauschenberg's artwork, "Erased de Kooning
Drawing." As Professor Adler described:
19. Rigamonti, supra note 2, at 357-58 (footnotes omitted).
20. "Modernizing copyright" has been the focus of the 2011 copyright law amend-
ment in Canada and a number of recent public consultations in Europe concerning
copyright law revision. See, e.g., Copyright Modernization Act, S.C. 2011, c. 22 (Can.);
IRISH COPYRIGHT REVIEW COMMITTEE, MODERNISING COPYRIGHT (2013); U.K. IN-
TELLECTUAL PROP. OFFICE, MODERNISING COPYRIGHT: A MODERN, ROBUST AND
FLEXIBLE FRAMEWORK (2012); Press Release, European Commission, Commission
Agrees Way Forward for Modernising Copyright in the Digital Economy (Dec. 5,
2012), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release-MEMO-12-950_en.htm.
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In 1953, Rauschenberg took a drawing by Willem de Kooning and
spent a month erasing it. The resulting work is a "sheet of paper
bearing the faint, ghostly shadow of its former markings." Entitling
the work "Erased de Kooning Drawing/Robert Rauschenberg/
1953," Rauschenberg exhibited the erasure as his own art. Raus-
chenberg wrote: "I wanted to create a work of art by [erasing] ....
Using my own work wasn't satisfactory . .. I realized that it had to
be something by someone who everybody agreed was great, and the
most logical person for that was de Kooning." 24
Rauschenberg's artwork is important not because of the erasing act
itself, but because of the context surrounding the act: Willem de
Kooning held an important place in the U.S. art scene in the 1950s,
and destruction art had yet to become as pervasive in contemporary
art as it is today.25 As Professor Adler elaborated:
At that time, abstract expressionism so dominated American art
(and our artistic place in the world) that de Kooning and his compa-
triots had come to be viewed as heroic and almost godlike. In that
climate, erasing a drawing by de Kooning was a shocking, sacrile-
gious act. It captured, perhaps better than anything else Raus-
chenberg did, his scandalous assault on a particular conception of
"art." For the generation of artists after de Kooning the question
was: how would it be possible to make art in the wake of the godlike
artists who came before them? Rauschenberg's answer was that new
art might be about its own failure to achieve greatness, its impotent
rebellion against the heroic past. Rauschenberg began to make art
that . . . was about "its own destruction. "26
Rauschenberg's "creative" assault on de Kooning's drawing therefore
provides an excellent illustration of "how art can emerge from the
near destruction of a previous piece" 2 7-a fact that moral rights seem
unable, or at least reluctant, to recognize. In fact, the successful com-
pletion of Rauschenberg's artwork largely "depends on the fact that
he violated not a reproduction of a work but an original, and not just
any original, but an original by Willem de Kooning." 28
Although Professor Adler's insights are important for both the on-
line and offline worlds, they become particularly important to the on-
line world, for three reasons. First, moral rights were created with
traditional works of art-such as writings, paintings, drawings, and
sculptures-in mind. As new works are being created using digital
technologies or disseminated through new technological means, it is
24. Id. at 283 (footnotes omitted and ellipses in original). It is worth noting that de
Kooning gave the drawing to Rauschenberg. Id. at 283 n.111.
25. See Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Hoisting Originality: A Response, 20 DEPAUL J.
ART, TECH. & INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 7 (2009) (noting that Rauschenberg's "erasure
work was unorthodox in its time" while "the concept of 'destruction art' is [now]
ubiquitous in the world of contemporary art").





fair to question whether the protection of moral rights has, in fact,
become outdated. Obsolescence is an issue Professor Adler tackled
head-on in her article, but this debate has only just begun.
Second, while moral rights as an institution deserve our urgent at-
tention, moral rights as protected under statutes or through case law
are equally important. Indeed, digital technologies have threatened to
make existing moral rights statutes obsolete. A case in point is VARA.
Even though VARA is not applicable to the digital environment,29 it
is instructive to highlight the significant problems works of digital vis-
ual art could pose to the present statutory language.
VARA was drafted with a specific limitation on the maximum num-
ber of autographed and consecutively numbered copies visual artists
can have before losing protection. Section 101 of the U.S. Copyright
Act specifically provides:
A "work of visual art" is-
(1) a painting, drawing, print or sculpture, existing in a single copy,
in a limited edition of 200 copies or fewer that are signed and con-
secutively numbered by the author, or, in the case of a sculpture, in
multiple cast, carved, or fabricated sculptures of 200 or fewer that
are consecutively numbered by the author and bear the signature or
other identifying mark of the author; or
(2) a still photographic image produced for exhibition purposes
only, existing in a single copy that is signed by the author, or in a
limited edition of 200 copies or fewer that are signed and consecu-
tively numbered by the author.30
While the limitation included in this definition makes sense in the
physical world, and it most certainly did in the late 1980s when VARA
was drafted, it would raise complications in the digital environment.
Consider photographs for example. As Llewellyn Gibbons recently
pointed out, VARA does not sit well with digital photographic
works." What does the language "a still photographic image" or "pro-
duced for exhibition purposes" mean? Would ephemeral copies count
toward the 200 maximum copies? How should the artist sign and num-
ber digital photos to comply with the statutory formalities? On a theo-
retical level, should "copy" still be used as a foundational concept in
moral rights law in the digital age? 3 2
29. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (stating that "[a] work of visual art does not include
. . . any . . . electronic information service, electronic publication, or similar
publication").
30. Id.
31. See Llewellyn Joseph Gibbons, Visual Artists Rights Act ("VARA") and the
Protection of Digital Works of "Photographic" Art, 11 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 531, 531-52
(2010) ("VARA poses numerous challenges to creators of digital visual art.").
32. See COMM. ON INTELLECTUAL PROP. RIGHTS & THE EMERGING INFO. INFRA-
STRUCTURE, NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE DIGITAL DILEMMA: INTELLEC-
TUAL PROPERTY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 230-32 (2000) [hereinafter DIGITAL
DILEMMA] (exploring whether "copy" is still an appropriate foundational concept for
copyright law in the digital age).
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Finally, and most importantly, the digital environment has provided
a new opportunity for users, appropriate artists, and other creative
appropriators-hereafter referred to as simply users-to reconcile
their re-creations with the originals.3 3 For example, Jessica Litman
pointed out that digital technologies have made it easier to protect the
integrity of a creative work. Under her proposal, "any adaptation, li-
censed or not, commercial or not, should be accompanied by a truth-
ful disclaimer and a citation (or hypertext link) to an unaltered and
readily accessible copy of the original."3 4 This proposal would allow
users to access the original work to judge for themselves how the two
works compare to each other. It would help "safeguard the work's
integrity . . . and protect[ ] our cultural heritage" while at the same
time providing users with an unencumbered ability to make the
needed modifications. 35
Drawing on this proposal, Neil Netanel called for the introduction
of a requirement for "those who disseminate a creative appropriation
... to label it as an unlicensed modification of the original work."36 As
he explained: "Those requirements would serve to accord authorship
attribution for the underlying work, avoid confusion regarding which
is the 'authentic,' copyright holder-authorized version, and refer in-
terested persons to the underlying works so that they can see what has
been changed.",3 According to his proposal, compliance can be easily
fulfilled by acts as simple as "leaving intact the copyright management
information that is digitally embedded in the underlying work when
portions of that work are incorporated in the creative appropria-
tion."" After all, the WIPO Internet Treaties," the Digital Millen-
nium Copyright Act ("DMCA"), 4 0 and the EU Information Society
Directive 41 already prohibited the intentional removal or alteration of
such information.
In a recent book, Roberta Kwall, a staunch and passionate defender
of moral rights in the United States, also proposed to use attribution
and disclosure to reconcile the protection of moral rights with the
competing demands of American constitutional values and our strong
need to maintain a well-endowed public domain. Among her recom-
33. See SUNDARA RAJAN, supra note 16, at 312-13 (discussing moral rights protec-
tion in the context of appropriation art).
34. JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 185 (2001).
35. Id.
36. NEIL WEINSTOCK NETANEL, COPYRIGHT'S PARADOx 215 (2008).
37. Id. at 215-16.
38. Id. at 216.
39. WIPO Copyright Treaty art. 12, Dec. 20, 1996, S. Treaty Doc. No. 105-17, at 1
(1997); WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty art. 19, Dec. 20, 1996, S. Treaty
Doc. No. 105-17, at 18 (1997).
40. 17 U.S.C. § 1202 (2012).
41. Directive 2001/29, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May
2001 on the Harmonisation of Certain Aspects of Copyright and Related Rights in the
Information Society, art. 7, 2001 O.J. (L 167) 10 [hereinafter EU InfoSoc Directive].
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mendations is "a narrowly tailored right of integrity designed to vindi-
cate the author's right to inform the public about the original nature
of her artistic message and the meaning of her work."4 2 Similar to
Professors Litman and Netanel's proposals, which prioritized the right
of attribution and replaced the right of integrity with the right of full
disclosure,4 3 Professor Kwall called for reforms that require "a dis-
claimer adequate to inform the public of the author's objection to the
modification or contextual usage.""
III. CREATIVE REUSE AND SEMIOTIC DEMOCRACY
Thanks to the high speed and low costs of reproduction and distri-
bution, the anonymous architecture, and the many-to-many communi-
cation capabilities, the Internet has become a particularly effective
means of communication. As Judge Stewart Dalzell recognized in
Reno v. ACLU in the early days of this communication medium, "the
Internet is the most participatory form of mass speech yet devel-
oped,"4 5 and its content "is as diverse as human thought."46
In light of the Internet's immense potential for political, social, eco-
nomic, and cultural developments, commentators-most notably Wil-
liam Fisher-have argued for the allowance of greater reuse and
modification of digital works to promote semiotic democracy.47
Coined by John Fiske in Television Culture,48 the term "semiotic de-
mocracy" was used by Professor Fisher to denote "the ability of 'con-
sumers' to reshape cultural artifacts and thus to participate more
actively in the creation of the cloud of cultural meanings through
which they move."49 As he explained, there are many benefits when
individuals can freely recode preexisting works:
People would be more engaged, less alienated, if they had more
voice in the construction of their cultural environment. And the en-
vironment itself . .. would be more variegated and stimulating....
In the future, sharing could encompass more creativity. The circula-
42. KWALL, supra note 12, at 151.
43. See Jane C. Ginsburg, Have Moral Rights Come of (Digital) Age in the United
States?, 19 CARDOzo ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 17 (2001) [hereinafter Ginsburg, Have
Moral Rights Come of (Digital) Age] (noting that Professor Litman's proposal does
not provide for "a true integrity right," but only "a full disclosure right"); Jacqueline
D. Lipton, Moral Rights and Supernatural Fiction: Authorial Dignity and the New
Moral Rights Agendas, 21 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 537, 563
(2011) (noting that both Professor Litman's and Professor Netanel's proposals priori-
tize the right of attribution over other moral rights, such as the right of integrity).
44. KWALL, supra note 12, at 151.
45. ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 883 (E.D. Pa. 1996), affd, 521 U.S. 844
(1997).
46. Id. at 842.
47. See WILLIAM W. FISHER III, PROMISES To KEEP: TECHNOLOGY, LAW, AND
THE FUTURE OF ENTERTAINMENT 28-31 (2004).
48. JOHN FISKE, TELEVISION CULTURE 76 (1987).
49. FISHER, supra note 47, at 184.
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tion of artifacts would include their modification, improvement, or
adaptation. To some degree, at least, such habits could help amelio-
rate the oft-lamented disease of modern culture: anomie, isolation,
hyper-individualism. Collective creativity could help us become
more collective beings.5 0
The need to develop a semiotic democracy is particularly important
today, when media ownership has become highly concentrated in a
few corporate oligopolies,"i and users actively and frequently question
the appropriateness of the existing copyright regime. Although the
treatment of user-generated content remains a new issue and policy-
makers and commentators have yet to reach a consensus on the ap-
propriate standards, the creation of this new type of content has
undoubtedly inspired innovative thinking about the development, dis-
semination, and exploitation of creative works.52 The need for user-
generated content to coexist with those the traditional entertainment
industries develop has also raised important questions about the fu-
ture development of the copyright and moral rights systems. 5 3
In Remix, Lawrence Lessig passionately argued for the need to en-
able Internet users to remix preexisting works.5 4 As he, Henry Jen-
kins, and others aptly pointed out, digital literacy in the future will go
beyond texts to include other forms of creative media.5 5 Remixes
50. Id. at 31.
51. See generally BEN H. BAGDIKIAN, THE NEW MEDIA MONOPOLY (2004) (ex-
amining the increasing concentration of the media industries); ROBERT W. MCCHES-
NEY, RICH MEDIA, POOR DEMOCRACY: COMMUNICATION POLITICS IN DUBIOUS
TIMES (1999) (examining the adverse impact concentrated corporate control of media
have on participatory democracy).
52. For discussions on the changes user-based creations and mass collaborations
have brought to the innovation system, see generally CHRIS ANDERSON, FREE: THE
FUTURE OF A RADICAL PRICE (2009); YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NET-
WORKS: How SOCIAL PRODUCTION TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND FREEDOM (2006);
CLAY SHIRKY, COGNITIVE SURPLUS: CREATIVITY AND GENEROSITY IN A CONNECTED
AGE (2010); CLAY SHIRKY, HERE COMES EVERYBODY: THE POWER OF ORGANIZING
WITHOUT ORGANIZATIONS (2008); DON TAPSCOTr & ANTHONY D. WILLIAMS, WIKI-
NOMics: How MASS COLLABORATION CHANGES EVERYTHING (expanded ed. 2008).
53. See Peter K. Yu, Digital Copyright and Confuzzling Rhetoric, 13 VAND. J.
ENT. & TECH. L. 881, 893-99 (2011) (discussing the ample and exciting opportunities
YouTube has provided for disseminating both traditional and user-generated content
and for shaping the development of copyright laws and user norms); Peter K. Yu,
Digital Copyright Reform and Legal Transplants in Hong Kong, 48 U. LOUISVILLE L.
REV. 693, 760 (2010) (noting the importance of the treatment of user-generated con-
tent to digital copyright reform).
54. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, REMIX: MAKING ART AND COMMERCE THRIVE IN THE
HYBRID ECONOMY 76-82 (2008).
55. See HENRY JENKINS, CONVERGENCE CULTURE: WHERE OLD AND NEW ME-
DIA COLLIDE 177 (2006) ("More and more literacy experts are recognizing that enact-
ing, reciting, and appropriating elements from preexisting stories is a valuable and
organic part of the process by which children develop cultural literacy."); LESSIG,
supra note 54, at 68-76 (discussing the importance and effectiveness of remixing me-
dia content and how "these other forms of 'creating' [have become] an increasingly
dominant form of 'writing'").
MORAL RIGHTS
therefore need to include not only texts, but also images, audio files,
and video clips. As Professor Lessig eloquently wrote:
Text is today's Latin. It is through text that we elites communicate
.... For the masses, however, most information is gathered through
other forms of media: TV, film, music, and music video. These
forms of "writing" are the vernacular of today. They are the kinds
of "writing" that matters most to most.56
Thus, if society is to ensure that users in future generations can fully
develop their creative, communicative, and intellectual capabilities-
or the various forms of literacy5 -reforms to the copyright and moral
rights systems are badly needed to provide greater flexibility for indi-
viduals to creatively reuse or modify preexisting works. Such reforms
will also open up the possibilities for developing a different form of
creativity that is "more collaborative and playful, less individualistic
or hierarchical."5 8
Unfortunately, moral rights may stand in the way of efforts to pro-
mote greater semiotic democracy, digital literacy, or "expressive di-
versity.",5 By conferring on authors what Robert Gorman described
as an "aesthetic veto,"6 0 moral rights have made it difficult and costly
for users to obtain the needed permission to reuse or modify preexist-
ing works. To begin with, determining whether and how authors
should be compensated is challenging, especially when only a small,
yet non-de minimis portion of the work has been used 6 1 or when the
new work has become far more successful than the original one-eco-
nomically or otherwise. Even Professor Fisher's attractive alternative
compensation proposal does not completely address this problem.6 2
56. LESSIG, supra note 54, at 68.
57. See John Hartley, Uses of YouTube, Digital Literacy and the Growth of Knowl-
edge, in JEAN BURGESS & JOSHUA GREEN, YOUTUBE: ONLINE VIDEO AND PAR-
TICIPATORY CULTURE 126-43 (2009) (discussing YouTube in relation to the
promotion of digital literacy).
58. FISHER, supra note 47, at 31.
59. See NETANEL, supra note 36, at 38-42 (discussing "expressive diversity").
60. Robert A. Gorman, Federal Moral Rights Legislation: The Need for Caution,
14 NOVA L. REV. 421, 424 (1990).
61. See Symposium, Virtual Reality, Appropriation, and Property Rights in Art: A
Roundtable Discussion, 13 CARDOzo ARTS & ENT. L.J. 91, 94-97 (1994) (discussing
the challenge posed by including small parts of copyright works into a larger conglom-
erate work).
62. See FISHER, supra note 47, at 199-258 (proposing to set up a government-
administered system that compensates copyright holders for the commercial and non-
commercial use of copyrighted works). Other commentators and organizations have
also advanced similar proposals. See FRED VON LOHMANN, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND.,
A BETTER WAY FORWARD: VOLUNTARY COLLECTIVE LICENSING OF Music FILE
SHARING (2004) (recommending that the recording industry adopt a voluntary collec-
tive licensing model similar to the one used by radio stations), available at http://
www.eff.org/files/eff-a-better-way-forward.pdf; DANIEL GERVAIS, APPLICATION OF
AN EXTENDED COLLECTIVE LICENSING REGIME IN CANADA: PRINCIPLES AND ISSUES
RELATED TO IMPLEMENTATION (2003) (calling for an extended collective licensing
system in which copyright holders opt out of a peer-to-peer licensing system while
2014] 883
884 TEXAS A&M LAW REVIEW [Vol. 1
As he conceded: "[Slemiotic democracy, like all forms of democracy,
carries with it risks and costs. . . . There are ways . . . that these risks
and costs could be substantially mitigated. But it is impossible to elim-
inate them altogether.""
More importantly, the protection of moral rights is not about pecu-
niary compensation. Rather, it speaks to creative control and artistic
integrity. In her book, Professor Kwall underscored an important spir-
itual link between the author and her work. By protecting the author's
meaning and message that the work embodies,6 4 moral rights recog-
nize the author's dignity interests" and the "inherent drive" that led
her to create the work in the first place.6 6 To a great extent, moral
rights highlight an important "intrinsic dimension" of creativity that
economic rights fail to recognize."
Some authors and commentators have gone even further to analo-
gize the relationship between the author and her work to the parent-
child relationship,68 an analogy Professor Kwall and Mira Sundara
Rajan have independently endorsed.69 As Gary Larson, the creator of
remaining inside on default), available at http://aixl.uottawa.ca/-dgervais/publica
tions/extendedlicensing.pdf; Raymond Shih Ray Ku, The Creative Destruction of
Copyright: Napster and the New Economics of Digital Technology, 69 U. CHI. L. REV.
263, 311-22 (2002) (proposing to impose statutory levies on Internet service subscrip-
tions and the sales of computer, audio, and video equipment); Neil W. Netanel, Im-
pose a Noncommercial Use Levy to Allow Free Peer-to-Peer File Sharing, 17 HARV.
J.L. & TECH. 1 (2003) (offering a blueprint for the establishment of a "noncommercial
use levy"); see also Peter K. Yu, P2P and the Future of Private Copying, 76 U. COLo.
L. REV. 653, 704-15 (2005) (discussing these proposals).
63. FISHER, supra note 47, at 37.
64. As Professor Kwall explained:
The concepts of a work's "meaning" and "message" . . . are related in that
they are dependent upon the creator's subjective vision rather than the vi-
sion of the creator's audience, but these terms nonetheless embrace some-
what distinct ideas. The creator's meaning personifies what the work stands
for on a level personal to the author, whereas the creator's message repre-
sents what the author is intending to communicate externally on a more uni-
versal level. A work's "meaning" therefore exemplifies the idea of "why I as
the creator got involved in doing this work and what I see in it." In contrast,
a work's "message" embodies the notion of "what I as creator expect others
to see in it, and what I hope they'll take from it."
KWALL, supra note 12, at 2-3.
65. See id. at 4-5 (noting the need for the legal system to "safeguard[] authorship
dignity").
66. See id. at 19 ("The intrinsic dimension focuses on creativity as a response to an
inherent drive rather than simply as a quest for economic reward.").
67. See id. at 11-22 (discussing the "intrinsic dimension of human creativity").
68. "[A]n artist may identify with his works as with his children: prize them for
their present character and not want that character changed." Henry Hansmann &
Marina Santilli, Authors' and Artists' Moral Rights: A Comparative Legal and Eco-
nomic Analysis, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 95, 102 (1997).
69. Professor Kwall described the "spiritual" relationship between the author and
her work:
[T]his relationship requires the author to infuse herself into her work, while
simultaneously maintaining the appropriate distance and perspective so that
MORAL RIGHTS
The Far Side Cartoons, wrote in a cease-and-desist letter concerning
the online reposting of his cartoons:
These cartoons are my "children," of sorts, and like a parent, I'm
concerned about where they go at night without telling me. And,
seeing them at someone's web site is like getting the call at 2:00 a.m.
that goes, "Uh, Dad, you're not going to like this much, but guess
where I am." I hope my explanation helps you to understand the
importance this has for me, personally, and why I'm making this
request. Please send my "kids" home. I'll be eternally grateful. 70
Thus far, commentators have questioned the appositeness of the
work-child analogy,7' especially in situations where waivers or assign-
ments are involved-such as in the United Kingdom7 2 or in the case
of cinematographic works.73 After all, parents are not supposed to sell
the work can emerge. Perhaps the best analogy to the type of relationship
... is that of a parent and child. The parenting experience, perhaps one of
the most humbling of all, requires the same delicate balance as that needed
to produce highly creative works of authorship. Parents must learn when to
become invested and when to take a step back and allow their offspring to
grapple with life's challenges on their own. Moreover, both parents and au-
thors know that their relationship with their "offspring" (both human and
intangible) requires a strong degree of faith-not necessarily in God or a
higher power, but faith in oneself as a creator, and in the vision of one's
emerging work. Ultimately, this perspective places an equal degree of im-
portance on the process of nurturing one's creation as it does on the ultimate
product.
KWALL, supra note 12, at xiv (footnote omitted); SUNDARA RAJAN, supra note 16, at
9 ("The work could only have been produced by its author, and was considered to be
a reflection of his unique personality. Accordingly, the work was practically an exten-
sion of the author himself-his 'spiritual child.'").
70. The letter is available at http://www.portmann.com/farside (last visited Oct. 12,
2010).
71. See WILLIAM PATRY, MORAL PANICS AND THE COPYRIGHT WARS 75 (2009)
("[A]t least in common law countries, including the United States, copyright is an
economic right, not a moral right concerned with preserving an ongoing, intimate
relationship between the author and the work. Acceptance of the parent-child meta-
phor would mean authors would not be permitted to sell or license their 'children."');
Cory Doctorow, In Praise of Fanfic, Locus MAG., May 16, 2007, http://www.locusmag
.com/Features/2007/05/cory-doctorow-in-praise-of-fanfic.html ("Writers can't ask
readers not to interpret their work. You can't enjoy a novel that you haven't inter-
preted-unless you model the author's characters in your head, you can't care about
what they do and why they do it. And once readers model a character, it's only natu-
ral that readers will take pleasure in imagining what that character might do offstage,
to noodle around with it. This isn't disrespect: it's active reading.").
72. See Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, c. 48, § 87(2) (Eng.) ("Any of
[the rights conferred by Chapter IV on moral rights] may be waived by instrument in
writing signed by the person giving up the right.").
73. See JOHN T. CROss, AMY LANDERS, MICHAEL MIRELES & PETER YU,
GLOBAL ISSUES IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAw 132 (2010) (discussing the compli-
cations raised by the large number of authors involved in a cinematographic work);
MICHAEL SPENCE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 99-101 (2007) (discussing film copy-
right under U.K. copyright law); SUNDARA RAJAN, supra note 16, at 375-435 (discuss-
ing moral rights protection in relation to film and other collaborative works); Neil
Netanel, Alienability Restrictions and the Enhancement of Author Autonomy in United
States and Continental Copyright Law, 12 CARDOzo ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 27 (1994)
2014] 885
TEXAS A&M LAW REVIEW
or license their children.7 4 Notwithstanding these criticisms, many au-
thors, undeniably, are personally attached to their creations. In fact,
many authors find moral rights an important means to ensure the
healthy growth of their "children."
Historically, moral rights served as a powerful legal device for au-
thors to protect their "children" against what Anthony Trollope called
"the book-selling leviathans." 76 As George Wither, an English author,
wrote emphatically in 1625:
For many of our moderne booksellers are but needlesse excrements,
or rather vermine, . . . yea, since they take upon them to publish
bookes contrived, altered and mangled at their own pleasures, with-
out consent of the writers; and to change the name sometymes, both
of booke and author (after they have been imprinted).
Even today, Author v. Copyright Holder-or its licensees or assign-
ees-remains "a common fact pattern in attribution disputes."7 8
As the public becomes more active in digital publishing and dissem-
ination, however, moral rights will precipitate more disputes between
authors and users. Consider, for example, the incident surrounding
the unauthorized release of an incomplete draft of Stephanie Meyer's
Midnight Sun.7 9 Written by the bestselling author of the Twilight Saga,
the book seeks to retell the story in the series' first book from the
perspective of Edward Cullen, the vampire love interest of Bella
Swan, the series' heroine.
When Meyer was halfway through the writing project, she circu-
lated drafts to a number of people for various reasons, not the least of
which being her eagerness to help those working on the film produc-
(noting that "the French and German Acts contain special provisions that sharply
limit the right in the area of film production"); Rigamonti, supra note 2, at 365 ("In
Germany, a separate statutory regime was established for motion pictures and for
works used in the production of motion pictures.").
74. See PATRY, supra note 71, at 75.
75. See Christopher J. Buccafusco & Christopher Jon Sprigman, The Creativity
Effect, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 31 (2011) (providing the results of an experiment demon-
strating that intellectual property transactions are subject to a creativity effect-"a
valuation anomaly . . . that may affect the way in which the originators of creative
works assign value to their creations"); Christopher J. Buccafusco & Christopher Jon
Sprigman, Valuing Intellectual Property: An Experiment, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 1
(2010) (providing the results of an experiment demonstrating that a substantial valua-
tion asymmetry exists between creators and purchasers of intellectual property, with
creators valuing their work more than twice as highly as potential buyers do).
76. ANTHONY TROLLOPE, AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY 308 (Michael Sadleir & Frederick
Page eds., 1980).
77. GILLIAN DAVIES, COPYRIGHT AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 22-23 (2d ed. 2002).
78. Hughes, Fixing Copyright, supra note 18, at 674.
79. See Lipton, supra note 43, at 556-58 (discussing the incident). Thanks to Jac-
queline Lipton for first bringing the incident to the Author's attention. See Jacqui




tion of Twilight to better understand her characters.80 One of these
drafts, unfortunately, was leaked onto the Internet. As a result, the
author received-both directly and indirectly (via the Internet)-a
large number of comments from readers about what they liked or dis-
liked about the draft. Frustrated by the experience, Meyer eventually
posted the incomplete draft onto her official website and indefinitely
suspended the project.
As she implied in her posted explanation, her concern was not so
much about free riding or the lack of monetary compensation. After
all, readers may still want to buy the finished product even if an in-
complete unauthorized draft has been posted onto the Internet.s'
Novels are experience goods; readers want more than mere informa-
tion about the plots, characters, dialogues, and most certainly the end-
ing. Rather, Meyer was frustrated by the lack of artistic control over
her work and the manuscript's ill-timed disclosure. More importantly,
she was disappointed by her inability to continue with the project and
complete it to her satisfaction. As she wrote:
I did not want my readers to experience Midnight Sun before it was
completed, edited and published. I think it is important for every-
body to understand that what happened was a huge violation of my
rights as an author, not to mention me as a human being. As the
author of the Twilight Saga, I control the copyright and it is up to
the owner of the copyright to decide when the books should be
made public; this is the same for musicians and filmmakers. . . . My
first feeling was that there was no way to continue. Writing isn't like
math; in math, two plus two always equals four no matter what your
mood is like. With writing, the way you feel changes everything. If I
tried to write Midnight Sun now, in my current frame of mind,
James [a tracker vampire who wanted to hunt Bella for sport] would
probably win and all the Cullens would die, which wouldn't dovetail
too well with the original story. In any case, I feel too sad about
what has happened to continue working on Midnight Sun, and so it
is on hold indefinitely.82
While receiving comments from readers might be helpful to authors
after they have completed their work, the untimely release of the in-
80. See Lipton, supra note 43, at 556.
81. As Professor Lipton explained:
Meyer could potentially . . . suffer economic harm if an early draft of her
manuscript is available online and she later commercially publishes an offi-
cial version. It is conceivable that someone might read the version available
online, decide they do not like it, and not bother to buy the final version,
when otherwise they may have bought it. Of course, it is equally possible-
and probably more likely-that her fans would have been titillated by the
online draft into buying the final published version to see what happens next
and perhaps to compare the early draft with the final product.
Id. at 558.
82. Midnight Sun: Edward's Version of Twilight, STEPHENIEMEYER.COM (Aug. 28,
2008), http://www.stepheniemeyer.com/midnightsun.html.
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complete draft and the resulting comments disrupted Meyer's creative
process. The comments she read or heard about inevitably will color
the work she is eventually to create (if she continues at all). Indeed,
there is a very strong likelihood that the finished product will be quite
different from what she originally intended.
Finally, violations of moral rights affect more than authors. Third
parties can have strong interests in preserving the work and stabilizing
its social and cultural meanings. In their economic analysis of moral
rights, Henry Hansmann and Marina Santilli explained how damage
to the integrity of one work could generate negative externalities on
owners of the author's other works as well as the public at large.8 3
Justin Hughes also explored in great depth the oft-overlooked audi-
ence interests in creative works.84 As he pointed out, in some situa-
tions, "the utility derived by passive non-owners from the stability of
propertized cultural objects [may be] greater than the utility that
would accrue to non-owners who want to recode cultural objects so
much that those non-owners need to be freed from existing legal con-
straints."8 5 In those situations, recoding seems inappropriate, and
moral rights will be needed to prevent unwanted recoding.
IV. LIBERATIVE REUSE AND DEMOCRACY
While the Internet and the development of user-generated content
are important to societies in general, they become critically important
to countries with heavy information control. In China, for example,
"[t]he growth of the Internet, in tandem with other technologies such
as short messaging services, has . . . engendered a phenomenon of
increasingly relevant 'public opinion' . . . , where incidents not neces-
sarily prioritized by traditional media receive national attention and
83. See Hansmann & Santilli, supra note 68, at 105-07.
84. See generally Justin Hughes, "Recoding" Intellectual Property and Overlooked
Audience Interests, 77 TEX. L. REV. 923 (1999).
85. Id. at 928. Nonetheless, the audience may not always want these objects to
have stabilized meanings. As Professor Sundara Rajan pointed out, in some non-
Western cultures, the audience may take on the active role of an aesthetic participant:
The idea of the audience as aesthetic participant may be somewhat unfamil-
iar to Western "high" culture. However, it is an ancient and well-established
principle in cultures of the East. The Sanskrit term, "rasa," describes the
ecstatic essence of the creative moment, and it is made possible by the
shared experience of artist and audience. The idea is beautifully explained
by Bharata, the fabled author of the Sanskrit treatise on classical perform-
ance known as the Natya Shastra: "Born in the heart of the poet, [aesthetic
experience] flowers as it were in the actor and bears fruit in the spectator.
All three in the serene contemplation of the work, form in reality a single
knowing object fused together."
SUNDARA RAJAN, supra note 16, at 21-22 (footnotes omitted). Indeed, "[b]y enabling
a physical rapprochement between author and audience, through engagement with the
work, digital technology supports the possibility of a new and closer relationship be-
tween them." Id. at 22.
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frequently lead to calls for government action and response."*8 The
Internet has also provided users with information about the way of life
in other countries, thereby enabling them to make informed judgment
about possibilities of life.8 1
More importantly, Internet communication carries with it texts,
images, audio files, and video clips that enable users to explore new
perspectives and worldviews. As Marci Hamilton pointed out in an
important article about art speech, art is subversive by nature and has
transformative potential.8 1 It enables us to experience unfamiliar
worlds and thereby gain new insights into the prevailing status quo.89
Even better, art is also safe, and it helps us experience new
worldviews without the attendant risks of living in an alternative uni-
verse or the need to push for political or social change.9 0 As Professor
Hamilton explained:
Through the imagination, art evinces what purely didactic speech
cannot-the "sensation" of an experience never had, a world never
seen. Conjuring up that which has not been experienced, it poses a
challenge to the participant's preconceived and preordained world
view. At a level similar to empathy ... the imagination takes one
beyond one's preexisting conceptions and intuitions about life,
power, and reality. The aesthetic experience does not occur at the
level of the semantic but rather the imaginary; thus, to be concep-
tually available, it must always be translated into the semantic. Art
does not challenge existing reality by posing counterfactuals. Nor is
the work of art a representation of "concepts of reality" or a copy of
reality. Instead, it creates the condition for imaginatively living
through a different world altogether. Two phenomena occur simul-
taneously within the participant's experience of art: (1) the recogni-
tion of preexisting world views, and (2) the act of defamiliarization,
the distancing of oneself from one's assumptive world view. They
86. China (Including Hong Kong), in ACCESs DENIED: THE PRACTICE AND POL-
Icy OF GLOBAL INTERNET FILTERING 265 (Ronald Deibert et al. eds., 2008).
87. See Peter K. Yu, Bridging the Digital Divide: Equality in the Information Age,
20 CARDOzo ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 23 (2002) [hereinafter Yu, Bridging the Digital
Divide] ("Bridging the global digital divide ... would facilitate the flow of informa-
tion from the less developed countries to the developed countries, and vice versa.
Such an effort would enable citizens and businesses in the developed countries to
make more informed decisions about matters concerning foreign countries and the
global community.").
88. See generally Marci A. Hamilton, Art Speech, 49 VAND. L. REV. 73 (1996)
(positing a theory that art performs a singular function in providing the means of
challenging government).
89. See id. at 86-96 (discussing how art enables the participant to recognize preex-
isting worldviews and distance oneself from one's assumptive worldview through the
act of defamiliarization).
90. See id. at 76 ("Art permits individuals to experience alternative worlds,
thereby providing an efficient and effective means of testing the status quo without
risk.").
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operate together to create a reorientation experiment, the commit-
ment-free experiencing of a perspective different from one's own. '
Given art's ability to challenge the status quo, Taliban Afghanistan
imposed a complete ban on the Internet. 92 Other countries-including
both democratic and authoritarian regimes-have also introduced
content regulations to control or temper with the digital
environment.9 3
Although government censorship, thus far, has been widely covered
both by the Western press and in academic literature, the potential
barrier copyright and moral rights pose to Internet freedom is sparsely
addressed. In fact, despite evidence to the contrary, 94 the public at
large in the West seemed greatly surprised when intellectual property
rights were used as a pretext for human rights abuse and civil liberties
violations. In September 2010, The New York Times published a de-
tailed report on the complaints by an outspoken Siberian environmen-
tal activist group about how Russian authorities, in the name of
protecting Microsoft's copyrighted software, had confiscated their
computers as well as those of other advocacy groups and opposition
newspapers.9 s That report generated a spirited-and for rights hold-
ers, highly unwanted-public debate about the need to re-examine in-
tellectual property protection and enforcement through the lens of
corporate social responsibility.9 6 The New York Times report and the
ensuing debate eventually led Microsoft to publicly announce a new
plan to provide blanket licenses to advocacy groups and media outlets,
91. Id. at 87-88 (footnotes omitted).
92. See Yu, Bridging the Digital Divide, supra note 87, at 37-38 (discussing the ban
the Taliban regime in Afghanistan imposed upon television and the Internet).
93. See Peter K. Yu, Six Secret (and Now Open) Fears of ACTA, 64 SMU L. REV.
975, 1050-59 (2011) (discussing how the establishment of the Anti-Counterfeiting
Trade Agreement by developed and like-minded countries has greatly undermined
the protection of free speech, free press, privacy, and other civil liberties throughout
the world).
94. See William P. Alford, Making the World Safe for What? Intellectual Property
Rights, Human Rights and Foreign Economic Policy in the Post-European Cold War
World, 29 NYU J. INT'L L. & POL. 135, 144-45 (1997) (noting that the U.S. coercive
trade policy provided China with "a convenient legitimization" for its repressive mea-
sures while constraining the United States's capacity to complain about such actions);
Peter K. Yu, Three Questions that Will Make You Rethink the U.S.-China Intellectual
Property Debate, 7 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 412, 424-32 (2008) (discuss-
ing how the United States's foreign intellectual property policy has greatly under-
mined its efforts to promote free flow of information and ideas in China).
95. Clifford J. Levy, Using Microsoft, Russia Suppresses Dissent, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
12, 2010, at Al.
96. See generally REBECCA MACKINNON, CONSENT OF THE NETWORKED: THE
WORLDWIDE STRUGGLE FOR INTERNET FREEDOM 115-65 (2012) (discussing how the
failure of Internet companies to be socially responsible and accountable has eroded
the Internet's democratic potential).
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thereby distancing itself from repressive authorities that have misused
intellectual property rights to suppress or silence dissent.9 7
In a recent article, I discussed how the balance of the copyright sys-
tem needs to be adjusted to reflect the different social conditions in
countries where information flows are heavily regulated 9"-a point
Neil Netanel also observed.99 In countries with heavy censorship, for
example, Internet users often will need to reuse, without permission,
materials previously approved by censors or that are only available
abroad. To provide an alternative source of information, they may
need to repost copyrighted stories, videos, or photos that otherwise
would not have been available. They may also need to repurpose pre-
existing materials to address issues that they otherwise cannot discuss
because of government censorship.
In repressive societies, parodies, satires, coded words, euphemisms,
and allusions to popular culture remain dominant vehicles of commu-
nication. 00 Materials that are seemingly unrelated to the intended
original message are often used to create associations, build in tacit
meanings, provide emotional effects, and ultimately avoid censorship.
Whether it is a remix of video clips from Western movies, the synchro-
nization of contents to rock 'n roll songs, or the modification of news
reports from foreign media, repurposed contents carry within them
rich "hidden transcripts" that provide important social
commentary.10
Although we sometimes distinguish works that are of public inter-
est-such as news stories-from those that are created for commercial
or entertainment purposes, this type of distinction is usually unhelpful
in countries where circulation of information is limited. Entertainment
products that are uncontroversial, highly commercial, and seemingly
frivolous could easily contain useful political information. It is indeed
not uncommon to find Hollywood movies or American television pro-
grams portraying different forms of government, the need for checks
97. See Clifford J. Levy, Microsoft Changes Policy amid Criticism It Backed Sup-
pression of Dissent in Russia, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14, 2010, at A4.
98. Peter K. Yu, Promoting Internet Freedom Through the Copyright System,
EJOURNAL USA, June 2010, at 7, available at http://iipdigital.usembassy.gov/st/english/
publication/2010/07/20100727141034enelrahc5.498904e-02.html#axzz2x86oqpEH.
99. See Neil Weinstock Netanel, Asserting Copyright's Democratic Principles in the
Global Arena, 51 VAND. L. REV. 217, 277-78 (1998) (arguing that "copyright should
be carefully tailored to give greater potency to its support of democratization and to
minimize the barriers that it may pose under various local conditions" and that "it
may be more conducive to democratic development to allow for a good measure of
compulsory licensing, with royalties set to enable widespread access, while also pro-
viding some remuneration to copyright owner").
100. See Ashley Esarey & Qiang Xiao, Below the Radar: Political Expression in the
Chinese Blogosphere, 48 ASIAN SURV. 752 (2008) (discussing the use of parodies, sat-
ires, coded words, euphemisms, and allusions to popular culture in communication in
repressive societies).
101. JAMES C. Scor, DOMINATION AND THE ARTS OF RESISTANCE: HIDDEN
TRANSCRIPTS (1992).
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and balances or separation of powers, and the protection of constitu-
tional rights and civil liberties.'0 2 While these commercial products
may have been created to provide entertainment, in some countries
they also supply an important window to the outside world.'
Furthermore, the creative reuse and modification of preexisting
materials can help promote the development of a vibrant democratic
culture, which in turn can affect a country's political future. As Jack
Balkin observed with respect to digital speech:
A democratic culture is the culture of widespread "ripping, mixing,
and burning," of nonexclusive appropriation, innovation, and com-
bination. It is the culture of routing around and glomming on, the
culture of annotation, innovation, and bricolage. Democratic cul-
ture . . . makes use of the instrumentalities of mass culture, but
transforms them, individualizes them, and sends what it produces
back into the cultural stream. In democratic culture, individuals are
not mere consumers and recipients of mass culture but active
appropriators.' 0 4
102. The three prequels to Star Wars, for example, are filled with issues concerning
corruption, slavery, federalism, democracy, racial tension, and the American govern-
ment. STAR WARS: EPISODE I-THE PHANTOM MENACE (Twentieth Century Fox
1999); STAR WARS: EPISODE II-ATTACK OF THE CLONES (Twentieth Century Fox
2002); STAR WARS: EPISODE III-REVENGE OF THE SITH (Twentieth Century Fox
2005).
103. Commentators noted the significant influence of Western popular culture on
the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. As a retired foreign service officer
observed:
From foreign films, Soviet audiences learned that people in the West did not
have to stand in long lines to purchase food, did not live in communal apart-
ments, dressed fashionably, owned cars, and enjoyed many conveniences not
available in the Soviet Union. Through foreign films-European as well as
American-they were able to see aspects of life in the West that contra-
dicted the negative views promulgated by the Soviet media. Audiences were
not so much listening to the soundtrack or reading the subtitles as watching
the doings of people on the screen-in their homes, in stores, on streets-
the clothes they wore, and the cars they drove. Such details, which showed
how people lived in the West, were very revealing for Soviet audiences.
Yale Richmond, Cultural Exchange and the Cold War: How the Arts Influenced Pol-
icy, 35 J. ARTS MGMT., L. & Soc'v 239 (2005); accord DEBORA J HALBERT, THE
STATE OF COPYRIGHT: THE COMPLEX RELATIONSHIP OF CULTURAL CREATION IN A
GLOBALIZED WORLD 87 (2014) ("[Western] television programs cracked the state-
sponsored cultural projects of the Soviets by providing a visual representation of an-
other possible world. They also captured their audiences with the soap opera qualities
of Dallas, where everyone wanted to know who shot J.R., and the adventures of
Michael Knight and his intelligent car."); Marci A. Hamilton, The TRIPS Agreement:
Imperialistic, Outdated, and Overprotective, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 613, 619
(1996) ("After the Berlin Wall fell, some said that East Germany fell because the East
Germans were enthralled with the ethos and consumer goods viewed every Friday
night on the U.S. television show 'Dallas.'").
104. Jack M. Balkin, Digital Speech and Democratic Culture: A Theory of Freedom




Creative reuse and modification of preexisting materials are therefore
highly valuable to society. They ensure that "[e]veryone-not just po-
litical, economic, or cultural elites-ha[ve] a fair chance to participate
in the production of culture, and in the development of the ideas and
meanings that constitute them and the communities and subcommuni-
ties to which they belong."'o
While the need to realize this democratic culture is not new, and
such realization draws on the socio-political foundations free speech
has helped build,' 0 6 digital technologies "change the social conditions
in which people speak . . . [and therefore] bring to light features of
freedom of speech that have always existed in the background but
now become foregrounded."' 0 7 As Professor Balkin forcefully argued,
democratic cultural participation is important for two reasons:
First, culture is a source of the self. Human beings are made out of
culture. A democratic culture is valuable because it gives ordinary
people a fair opportunity to participate in the creation and evolu-
tion of the processes of meaning-making that shape them and be-
come part of them; a democratic culture is valuable because it gives
ordinary people a say in the progress and development of the cul-
tural forces that in turn produce them.
Second, participation in culture has a constitutive or performative
value: When people are creative, when they make new things out of
old things, when they become producers of their culture, they exer-
cise and perform their freedom and become the sort of people who
are free. That freedom is something more than just choosing which
cultural products to purchase and consume; the freedom to create is
an active engagement with the world.' 08
Thus, in countries where information flows are heavily controlled, cre-
ative reuse can actually become liberative reuse. Such reuse enables
the development of not only semiotic democracy, but democracy in
general.
105. Id. at 4.
106. As Professor Balkin pointed out:
The populist nature of freedom of speech, its creativity, its interactivity, its
importance for community and self-formation, all suggest that a theory of
freedom of speech centered around government and democratic delibera-
tion about public issues is far too limited. The free speech principle has al-
ways been about something larger than democracy in the narrow sense of
voting and elections, something larger even than democracy in the sense of
public deliberation about issues of public concern. If free speech is about
democracy, it is about democracy in the widest possible sense, not merely at
the level of governance, or at the level of deliberation, but at the level of
culture. The Internet teaches us that the free speech principle is about, and
always has been about, the promotion and development of a democratic
culture.
Id. at 34.
107. Id. at 2.
108. Id. at 35.
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Unfortunately, moral rights may stand in the way of a democratic
culture the same way it does in the way of semiotic democracy. One of
the widely reported examples in China concerns a viral video about a
bloody murder caused by a mantou (steamed bun).109 Developed in
the emerging tradition of egao-a form of online parody or satire that
relies on the author's "messing" with or making fun of preexisting me-
dia content"o-the video was created by mashing up the footage of
acclaimed Chinese film director Chen Kaige's extravagant, yet some-
what disappointing movie, Wuji (The Promise), a legal affairs program
from China's state broadcaster CCTV, and a small quantity of other
copyrighted materials."'
Instead of a historic epic fantasy Chen intended, the video took the
form of "a mock legal-investigative TV program," reporting about a
murder that a steamed bun had caused." 2 This frivolous-sounding
video touched on many contemporary socio-economic problems in
China. It was timely and entertaining. It arguably also contained some
socio-political value. Nonetheless, the famous film director was upset
and eventually threatened to sue the videomaker for copyright in-
fringement and defamation. As Chen told reporters from Sina.com, a
Chinese Internet portal: "I think this [parody] has exceeded the nor-
mal bounds of issuing commentary and opinion. It's an arbitrary alter-
ation of someone else's intellectual property."" 3 Although news
about the lawsuit slowly disappeared, the film director's reactions to
the parody clip have sparked an important debate about the need for
greater protection of parodies and satires in China.
To alleviate the tension between free speech and moral rights, com-
mentators have called for greater recognition of parodies in the moral
rights regime." 4 The introduction of a parody exception, however,
does not always resolve this tension. In fact, many strong moral rights
regimes already include a parody exception. Article L. 122-5(4) of the
Code de la Propridtd Intellectuelle, for example, provides: "Once a
work has been disclosed, the author may not prohibit ... parody, pas-
109. See Dexter Roberts, A Chinese Blogger's Tale, Bus. WK., Mar. 23, 2006 (re-
porting about the video).
110. See Esarey & Xiao, supra note 100, at 764; Wu Jiao, E'gao: Art Criticism or
Evil?, CHINA DAILY, Jan. 22, 2007, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2007-01/22/
content_788600.htm. A sociology professor at Peking University defines egao as "a
subculture characterized by satirical humour, revelry, grassroots spontaneity, a defi-
ance of authority and mass participation." Id.
111. See Roberts, supra note 109.
112. Id.
113. Robert S. Rogoyski & Kenneth Basin, The Bloody Case that Started from a
Parody: American Intellectual Property Policy and the Pursuit of Democratic Ideals in
Modern China, 16 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 237, 262-63 (2009).
114. See, e.g., Geri J. Yonover, The Precarious Balance: Moral Rights, Parody, and
Fair Use, 14 CARDOzo ARTS & ENT. L.J. 79,122 (1996) (proposing that "when moral
rights under section 106A are asserted against a parodist, ... a court should presume
that the parodist's use is a fair one, even if it is a commercial use").
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tiche and caricature, observing the rules of the genre."' 1 5 Despite this
exception, which courts have narrowly construed, the ability of indi-
viduals to make unauthorized reuse or modification of a creative work
remains severely curtailed in France."' 6
V. RIGHT TO DELETE
Parts I to III have examined areas in which moral rights may have
been too strong. This Part focuses instead on an area where these
rights may not have gone far enough. Commentators, policymakers,
and the public at large have become increasingly concerned about the
permanent existence of personal information and other materials on
the Internet.'1 7 As a result, they began to explore the need to intro-
duce a new "right to delete" into the digital environment." 8
The debate on this new right ties well into our present discussion of
moral rights; it touches on the right of withdrawal (or the right of re-
traction-le droit de repentir ou de retrait).119 As Jeremy Phillips ob-
served, even though the right of withdrawal is rather insignificant
within the moral rights regime, that right paradoxically has become
"the most significant moral right in the context of the wiki [or other
digital platforms], where a work may be of only temporary or ephem-
eral interest and the author may have a pressing and continuing need
to change his posted text or withdraw it completely from its . . .
host." 120
The debate on the right to delete also touches on what commenta-
tors have referred to as the "right to destroy" 12 1-a right that has not
115. Code de la Propridt6 Intellectuelle Art. L. 122-5(4) (1992) (Fr.); see also EU
InfoSoc Directive, supra note 41, art. 5(3)(k).
116. As Mary LaFrance observed:
[Tjhe limiting phrase "observing the rules of the genre" leaves much room
for interpretation. In an attempt to balance moral rights against free expres-
sion, the French courts have applied this exception only where the parodic
work has a humorous intention, and only where the parody is clearly distinct
from the work being parodied.
MARY LAFRANCE, GLOBAL ISSUES IN COPYRIGHT LAW 228 (2009); see also GARNETT
& DAVIES, supra note 1, at 380 (discussing the limited exception in France in relation
to song parodies).
117. See, e.g., J.D. Lasica, The World Wide Web Never Forgets, AM. JoURN. REV.,
June 1998, at 68; J.D. Lasica, The Net Never Forgets, SALON (Nov. 25, 1998, 2:00 PM
CST), http://www.salon.com/1998/11/25/feature_253/.
118. See generally VIKTOR MAYER-SCHONBERGER, DELETE: THE VIRTUE OF FOR-
GETrING IN THE DIGITAL AGE (2009) (discussing the need to introduce into digital
technology a capacity to forget).
119. As Professor Kwall pointed out, "[t]he right of withdrawal ... is connected to
the right of disclosure in that the author also enjoys the right to determine whether a
work should be withdrawn from the public if it no longer reflects the author's convic-
tions or spirit." KWALL, supra note 12, at 44.
120. Jeremy Phillips, Authorship, Ownership, Wikiship: Copyright in the Twenty-
First Century, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE FUTURE OF EU COPYRIGHT 193, 208
(Estelle Derclaye ed., 2008).
121. E.g., Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, The Right to Destroy, 114 YALE L.J. 781 (2005).
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yet been recognized as a moral right. In their works on the latter, the
late Joseph Sax and Lior Strahilevitz described the many actions art-
ists have taken to destroy their creative works. 122 As Professor
Strahilevitz reminded us, a strong justification exists for the right to
destroy in creative works:
A society that does not allow authors to have their draft works de-
stroyed posthumously could have less literary product than a society
that requires the preservation of all literary works not destroyed
during the author's life. Protecting authors' rights to destroy should
encourage high-risk, high-reward projects, and might prevent writ-
ers from worrying that they should not commit words to paper un-
less they have complete visions of the narrative structures for their
work.123
Likewise, Professor Sax believed that "an artist should be entitled to
decide how the world will remember him or her."' 24 A right to destroy
therefore serves important functions for not only the authors but also
society at large.
In the digital context, Viktor Mayer-Sch6nberger underscored the
need for individuals to delete works they have created on the Internet.
As he observed, "tensions will remain between an individual's desire
to forget and a society's desire to remember (and vice versa)." 2 5 To
help resolve these tensions, Professor Mayer-Schbnberger proposed
to "mimic human forgetting in the digital realm . . . by associating
information we store in digital memory with expiration dates that
users set."' 26 This proposal dovetails with Professor Balkin's earlier
proposal for greater regulation of the collection, use, or purchase of
personal data by government.12 7 Professor Balkin argued further that
Congress should "institutionalize government 'amnesia' by requiring
that some kinds of data be regularly destroyed after a certain amount
of time unless there were good reasons for retaining the data." 1 28
As far as moral rights are concerned, the right to delete raises im-
portant questions that require us to revisit the debate on the right of
122. See JOSEPH L. SAX, PLAYING DARTS WITH A REMBRANDT: PUBLIC AND PRI-
VATE RIGHTS IN CULTURAL TREASURES 200-01 (2001) (discussing the mistreatment
of some of the greatest artifacts of our civilization by their owners, including their
destruction); Strahilevitz, supra note 121, at 830-35 (exploring whether a creator has
more leeway to destroy a piece of property than an ordinary owner who acquires it
through purchase, inheritance, or gift).
123. Strahilevitz, supra note 121, at 832.
124. SAX, supra note 122, at 200.
125. MAYER-SCHONBERGER, supra note 118, at 190.
126. Id. at 171.
127. See Jack M. Balkin, The Constitution in the National Surveillance State, 93
MINN. L. REV. 1, 21 (2008) (calling for Congress to "pass new superstatutes to regu-




withdrawal. Although many countries, including Francel 2 9 and Ger-
many,'3 0 have recognized a right of withdrawal, retraction, or revoca-
tion as part of their moral rights regimes, this specific right usually
comes with significant qualifications. As Cyrill Rigamonti described:
[I]n France and Germany, if authors reconsider their decision and
further divulge their work after retracting it, the assignees enjoy a
right of first refusal and have the option of exploiting the work
under the terms and conditions of the initial contract. Moreover, the
right of withdrawal may not be exercised for just any reason. The
German copyright statute specifically states that the right of with-
drawal can be exercised only if authors can no longer reconcile the
contents of their works with their personal convictions, and the Ital-
ian copyright statute explicitly requires "serious moral reasons."
The same is true in France on the grounds that the right of with-
drawal is subject to the general civil law rule that the abuse of rights
is not protected, whereas such abuse is assumed whenever the au-
thor's exercise of the right of withdrawal is not motivated by his or
her personal internal debate about whether to further divulge the
work. In other words, monetary concerns alone will not suffice.' 31
Given these substantial qualifications and the fact that the right of
withdrawal is rarely litigated, Professor Rigamonti considered this
right "largely an example of symbolic legislation." 3 2
At the international level, the Berne Convention does not include
this rarely litigated right either. As noted earlier, article 6bis of the
Convention protects only the rights of attribution and integrity. 33
Similarly, and in a large part due to the omission in the Berne Con-
vention, weak moral rights regimes do not offer protection to the right
of withdrawal. Consider, for example, VARA in the United States.
Although the statute includes a right to prevent destruction of
129. Code de la Propri6td Intellectuelle Art. L. 121-4 (1992) (Fr.). In France, this
right is known as droit de retrait et de repentir (right of withdrawal and repentance).
130. Urheberrechtsgesetz [UrhG] [Copyright Law], Sept. 9, 1965, as amended, art.
42 (Ger.). In Germany, this right is known as Ruickrufsrecht wegen gewandelter
Uberzeugung (right of revocation for changed conviction).
131. Rigamonti, supra note 2, at 363 (footnotes omitted); see also GARNETr & DA-
VIES, supra note 1, at 388 ("Although the author is the only person who can decide
whether to withdraw his work from circulation or to modify it, it is agreed that he can
only do so for moral or intellectual reasons; there should be no financial motivation
for the decision, as this would constitute an abuse of his rights." (footnote omitted));
SUNDARA RAJAN, supra note 16, at 66 (noting that the clause concerning the right of
first refusal and the option of exploiting the work under the original terms and condi-
tions "provides careful protection against the possibility of an author using the right
of withdrawal to escape from the terms of a publication contract which he might later
find undesirable-or, indeed, to alter those terms through the exercise of the right, by
seeking to re-publish the work on new terms, with a new publisher").
132. Rigamonti, supra note 2, at 363.
133. Berne Convention, supra note 8, art. 6bis.
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"work[s] of recognized stature,"' 3 4 that right is closer to a right of
preservation than a right of withdrawal or a right to destroy.3
Finally, given the complexity of the digital environment, it is unclear
how broad a right to delete should or could be and how practical and
effective it would be if such a right came into existence. It also re-
mains to be seen whether users in collaborative settings (such as con-
tributors to blogs, wikis, fan sites, or virtual worlds) could ensure the
modification or removal of unwanted postings or creations. 136
Today, the Internet has made it awfully difficult, if not virtually im-
possible, for individuals to withdraw creative works once they become
available-be they photographic images, audio files, or video clips.
Sometimes, these works will appear in their original format. At other
times, however, they will appear in the form of collages, remixes, or
mashups-as in the oft-cited, yet unfortunate case of the Star Wars
Kid,'" whose videos remain widely available on YouTube. Even when
the electronic files are deleted, there is no guarantee that it does not
retain an "electronic footprint" in the form of edit history, archives, or
privately controlled digital memory.'3 8
If these questions are not challenging enough, the right to delete
recalls the oft-discussed dilemma copyright and moral rights scholars
face: Who should decide whether a work can be destroyed? The text-
book illustration of this dilemma involves Franz Kafka's instructions
to his executor and friend, Max Brod, to destroy all unpublished man-
uscripts upon his death. Had Brod followed the instructions, two of
Kafka's then-unpublished masterpieces, The Castle and The Trial,
would not have seen the light of day. Because these two works are
now "widely acknowledged as being highly influential in modern
Western literature,"' 3 9 readers and scholars are, most certainly, thank-
ful that the executor defied the author's ill-advised dying wish.
The Kafka example has raised difficult questions about not only the
author's right to control, but also who is in the best position to make
decisions about such control, especially after the author's death.140 As
134. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3)(B) (2012).
135. See Justin Hughes, The Line Between Work and Framework, Text and Context,
19 CARDOzo ARTS & ENT. L.J. 19, 22 (2001) (equating "a right to prevent destruction
of a work" with "a right 'of preservation"').
136. See SUNDARA RAJAN, supra note 16, at 513-19 (discussing moral rights protec-
tion in relation to Wikipedia and other collective creations); Phillips, supra note 120,
at 207-08 (discussing the difficulties in applying moral rights principles to the creation
of wikis).
137. See Star Wars Kid Files Lawsuit, WIRED (July 24, 2003), http://www.wired.com/
culture/lifestyle/news/2003/07/59757 (reporting the lawsuit sparked by the posting of
the "Star Wars Kid" video).
138. Phillips, supra note 120, at 208 n.33.
139. Linda J. Lacey, Of Bread and Roses and Copyrights, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1532,
1594 n.263.
140. See Peter K. Yu, Cultural Relics, Intellectual Property, and Intangible Heritage,
81 TEMP. L. REV. 433, 474-81 (2008) (discussing the tension between the need of
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Linda Lacey asked two decades ago in a hypothetical drawn from
Kafka's will, "Who should prevail . . . when an artist's will orders the
destruction of her paintings and an art expert challenges the will, de-
claring that the paintings are masterpieces that would become an inte-
gral part of the culture of the artist's homeland?" 4 1 To some extent,
the right to delete brings back the debate on this very difficult ques-
tion. After all, the Internet is as much about individual users as it is
about the collaborative exchange among these individuals.
VI. CONCLUSION
This Article closely examines four new questions the arrival of the
Internet and new communications media has posed to the moral rights
regime. Digital technologies, however, do not pose a unidirectional
challenge to the moral rights regime. Rather, in a creative destructive
way, these technologies help reinforce moral rights protection at the
same time as they are posing new challenges. For example, digital
rights management tools "serve purposes akin to moral rights, first by
assuring attribution to the author, artist, or composer, and second by
ensuring the integrity of documents, images, and music."14 2 In addi-
tion, by preventing false attribution of authorship and the intentional
removal or alteration of copyright management information, the
WIPO Internet Treaties, the DMCA, and the EU Information Society
Directive have greatly strengthened the existing moral rights re-
gime.143 The wide availability of digital technologies for tracking down
the originals and to fashion a disclosure remedy have also provided
authors with additional protection. To some extent, digital technolo-
gies may have ensured that moral rights "come of age" in the United
States, as Jane Ginsburg surmised.1 4 4
In short, the arrival of the Internet and new media technologies has
presented a similar "digital dilemma" as the one widely discussed in
the copyright context.145 Although the challenges-and perhaps the
stakes, especially in the United States-are somewhat different,
resolving these challenges is unlikely to be easy. In fact, if the diffi-
scientific and museum communities for access to indigenous artifacts and body re-
mains on the one hand and the interests of indigenous peoples and traditional com-
munities on the other).
141. Lacey, supra note 139, at 1593-94.
142. Kenneth W. Dam, Self-help in the Digital Jungle, 28 J. LEGAL STUD. 393, 405
(1999).
143. See KWALL, supra note 12, at 26 ("[Wjhen Congress enacted the Digital Mil-
lennium Copyright Act in 1998, it included a de facto right of attribution through the
copyright management information provisions."); Ginsburg, Have Moral Rights Come
of (Digital) Age, supra note 43, at 11 ("The DMCA may contain the seeds of a more
general attribution right: with sufficient ingenuity and effort, these seeds might be
made to germinate. The seeds may be found in the section 1202 provision on 'Copy-
right Management Information."').
144. Ginsburg, Have Moral Rights Come of (Digital) Age, supra note 43, at 9.
145. DIGITAL DILEMMA, supra note 32.
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culty in providing satisfactory responses to the challenges in the copy-
right arena provides any guidance, the prospects for resolving
challenges in the moral rights context can be equally dim. It is there-
fore high time we start paying attention to questions in this area.
In his seminal article, The Refrigerator of Bernard Buffet, Henry
Merryman reminded us that "the moral right of the artist, still com-
paratively young even in the nation of its origin, has not reached any-
thing like its full development.""' Although Professor Merryman
wrote the article close to four decades ago, his important insight is still
alive today. Digital technologies have provided moral rights with both
reinforcements and challenges. As moral rights continue to grow and
mutate, their development will undoubtedly be shaped by the needs
and demands of a rapidly changing socio-technological environment.
Whether moral rights will become stronger or weaker, broader or nar-
rower, relevant or obsolete will remain highly contingent on the devel-
opment of this environment.
146. John Henry Merryman, The Refrigerator of Bernard Buffet, 27 HASTINGS L.J.
1023, 1026 (1976).
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